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The Rise and Fall of Glass-Steagall
 
B Y  W A R R E N  C .  G I B S O N  A N D  J E F F R E Y  R O G E R S  H U M M E L  
The ongoing financial crisis has pundits, blog­gers, academics, and politicians scrambling for explanations. Deregulation gets a major share 
of their attention, specifically the 1999 repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Just what was Glass-Steagall 
and how did it come about? 
Bank failures were among the most dramatic and 
devastating aspects of the Great Depression. A wave of 
failures swept the country in 1930. A second and 
stronger wave followed in 1933. In all some 9,000 
banks failed, taking with them all 
or part of the savings of millions of 
individuals and businesses. Perhaps 
the most significant response to 
this crisis was the Glass-Steagall 
Act, officially known as the Bank­
ing Act of 1933. (Glass-Steagall 
originally referred to a measure 
enacted in 1931 that was con­
cerned mainly with powers of the 
Federal Reserve System, but that 
name now generally refers to the 
1933 act.) 
Glass-Steagall was a far-reaching measure that estab­
lished federal deposit insurance (see The Freeman, June 
2010; www.tinyurl.com/2v5u9cf) as well as separation 
of investment banking from deposit, or commercial, 
banking. Although it is rightly classed as one of the 
New Deal reforms, the bill had been debated before 
Roosevelt’s assumption of the presidency in March 
1933 and the bank holiday the same month. In fact, 
Senator Carter Glass had long made known his opposi­
tion to “universal banking,” in which single firms could 
conduct deposit banking, investment banking, and 
Roosevelt with, to his right and left, respectively, 
Glass and Steagall. 
other financial activities. Glass had been a sponsor of 
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and by 1933 was with­
out doubt the most respected and powerful politician 
on matters related to banking. 
The Glass-Steagall separation of investment and 
deposit banking was generally repealed by the Gramm­
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, during the administration of 
Bill Clinton. However, in response to the financial cri­
sis of 2008, there has been much discussion of whether 
repeal was a mistake and whether some or all of its 
restrictions should be reinstated.We 
can gain valuable perspective on 
the current situation and calls for 
reform if we know a little about 
Glass-Steagall. What problems was 
it supposed to solve? What political 
incentives were at work? What new 
problems might it have caused? 
Investment banking seems quite 
different from commercial banking. 
We might even wonder why both 
are called banking. Deposit banks 
accept deposits and make loans. 
They provide benefits to savers who couldn’t reasonably 
find and assess borrowers on their own, and to borrow­
ers who would have a hard time finding lenders. Invest­
ment banks underwrite securities, meaning they help 
companies issue new equity (shares of stock) or debt 
securities (bonds). They perform similar services for 
state and local governments that wish to issue bonds. 
Warren Gibson (warren@gibson2.com) teaches engineering at Santa Clara 
University and economics at San Jose State University. Jeffrey Rogers 
Hummel (jeff@jrhummel.com) is an associate professor of economics at San 
Jose State University. 
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They set an offering price, line up buyers, and some­
times guarantee to absorb the securities themselves 
should any remain unsold. Unless they keep some of 
the new securities on their books, their work is finished 
once the securities are sold. 
Some of the skills and practices of investment 
bankers are quite similar to those of bank-lending offi­
cers. Lenders must investigate the creditworthiness of 
prospective borrowers. Investment bankers must per­
form the same sort of due diligence in deciding 
whether to underwrite a proposed security offering 
and if so, how to price it. Firms that combine commer­
cial and investment banking under one roof thus tend 
to be more efficient, a situation that economists call 
“economies of scope.” If they successfully exploit 
economies of scope, combined firms provide lasting 
benefits to their corporate clients and 
propriated corporate opportunities to bank officers, 
engaged in insider lending practices and unsound 
transactions with affiliates. Evidence also pointed to 
cases where banks had made unsound loans to assist 
their affiliates and to protect the securities under­
written by the affiliates. Confusion by the public as 
to whether they were dealing with a bank or its 
securities affiliate and loss of confidence were also 
cited as adverse consequences of the securities affili­
ate system. 
Who said that? None other than Paul Volcker, for­
mer chairman of the Federal Reserve System, who was 
given credit (perhaps exaggerated) for stopping the 
inflation of the late 1970s and who has reentered pub­
lic life as an adviser to President Obama. (More about 
Volcker and the proposed Volcker 
indirectly to consumers, as well as Rule below.) 
higher profits to themselves—at least One senator said For years Glass had been frustrated 
until competing firms bid away those in his attempts to legislate separation the government 
profits. of commercial and investment bank-
should “treat [bank ing. Revelations of supposed abuses 
Pecora Hearings by National City Bank (NCB) of presidents] the same 
The main impetus for the separa- New York and its president, disclosed tion aspect of Glass-Steagall was as they treated in the Pecora hearings, provided the 
a ser ies of congressional hear ings spark to ignite the issue and give Al Capone.” known as the Pecora hearings, named Glass his victory. Senator Burton 
for the chief counsel of the Senate 
Committee on Banking and Currency. The hearings 
took place in 1933 and 1934 and generated some 
11,000 pages of testimony. Ever since that time the Pec­
ora hearings have been cited as firmly establishing the 
abuses that can and did arise when a single firm is 
allowed to engage in both deposit banking and invest­
ment banking, and as justifying government interven­
tion to curb those abuses. This belief, by now 
something of an urban legend in financial and regula­
tory circles, is summarized in the following congres­
sional testimony given in 1986: 
[The Pecora hearings] on the securities practices of 
banks disclosed that bank affiliates had underwrit­
ten and sold unsound and speculative securities, 
published deliberately misleading prospectuses, 
manipulated the price of particular securities, misap-
Wheeler thundered, “The best way to 
restore confidence in our banks, is to take these 
crooked presidents out of the banks and treat them the 
same as they treated Al Capone when Capone avoided 
payment of his tax.” 
The Witch Hunt 
The press got on board to the point where the Lit­erary Digest reported that “Apologies, even resigna­
tions, do not satisfy listening editors.” Heywood Broun, 
a leading columnist and perhaps the Paul Krugman of 
his day, piled on with, “The only thing that some of our 
great financial institutions overlooked during the years 
of boom was the installation of a roulette-wheel for the 
convenience of depositors.” The hearings and their 
aftermath, it is fair to say, had become a witch hunt. 
NCB was a leading New York bank, restrained by 
law to operate only within the city. Its subsidiary, 
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National City Company (NCC), had become the 
largest and most prominent commercial-bank-related 
securities underwriter, with offices in many cities 
besides New York. National City and its president, 
Charles Mitchell, were charged with numerous mis­
deeds. Mitchell allegedly arranged his affairs so as to 
avoid income tax. It was also alleged that the bank paid 
high salaries and bonuses and made special lending 
facilities available to executives. 
These are scarcely criminal offenses. But among the 
more serious charges, executives allegedly profited from 
the firm’s own securities underwritings. For example, 
National City bought a large block of stock in the new 
Boeing Corporation. Rather than sell this stock to the 
public, Pecora charged that NCC “retained a large 
block for itself and allotted the remainder to Mr. 
Mitchell and a select list of officers, 
gated numerous other charges against NCB and 
showed that none had any substantial basis in fact. Sim­
ilar charges were brought against the Chase Bank, its 
president Alfred Wiggins, and the affiliated Chase Secu­
rities Corporation. Bentson also showed that these 
charges were mostly unsubstantiated—and added a 
thorough critique of the supposed theoretical problems 
of universal banks such as conflicts of interest. 
Caveat Emptor 
But what about conflict of interest? It is certainly possible that a banker in a combined firm might 
steer customers into ill-suited investments or insur­
ance products. This is a hazard we face whenever we 
deal with professionals, such as physicians who advise 
treatments and also provide them, or lawyers who 
advise lawsuits and offer to file them. 
directors, key men, and special Such hazards are manageable: We can 
friends.” But an internal NCC mem- The press got on always get a second opinion or con­
orandum concerning this stock says, sult a fee-based financial planner orboard and the 
“[O]n account of the fact this indus- simply rely on the professional’s 
try is still somewhat unseasoned, even hearings ultimately incentive to maintain a reputation for 
though we regard this particular com- ethical service. leading to Glass­
pany as sound and having a very Financial institutions have widened 
bright future, we were not quite ready Steagall turned into their offerings considerably in recent 
to make a general offering to our cus- years without any apparent problems. a witch hunt.tomers. It would have been next to At the website of Wells Fargo Bank, 
impossible to avoid taking orders 
from the type of investor who should not buy this 
stock. Therefore, our own family and certain officers 
and employees of the Boeing Co. and affiliations have 
taken the entire issue.” 
Not only does this not sound improper, but in fact it 
sounds like just the sort prudent regard for customers’ 
best interests that was supposed be lacking in combined 
firms such as NCB/NCC. 
The committee produced a Mr. Brown, a witness 
who claimed to have lost $100,000 as a result of an 
NCC salesman’s bad advice. Bankrupt and in ill health, 
Mr. Brown was an ideally sympathetic witness, but it 
turned out that he had been a successful businessman 
and not a novice. NCB was forbidden to call rebuttal 
witnesses. 
In his 1990 book, The Separation of Investment and 
Commercial Banking, Professor George Bentson investi­
for example, one finds not only tradi­
tional deposit and savings accounts and loans of all 
sorts, but also stock brokerage, mutual funds, automo­
bile insurance, homeowner’s insurance, and even pet 
insurance. (But the Wells Fargo branch in a nearby 
Safeway store didn’t catch on and was closed.) Similarly, 
Charles Schwab, which began as a discount broker, now 
offers a full range of investment products and advice as 
well as banking services through its affiliated bank. 
Customers enjoy expanded services and lower prices as 
a result of the widening of competition among tradi­
tionally distinct firms. There is no sign of significant or 
widespread problems arising from conflicts of interest 
in such firms. 
Combined firms are not assured success. Sears, Roe­
buck, for example, once decided to get into financial 
services. Sears as such couldn’t just start accepting 
deposits and making loans, nor could any commercial 
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bank start selling underwear. But it formed a holding 
company, and the combination was effected. For a brief 
time customers in a nearby Sears, clutching their 
underwear purchases, could wander across the aisle into 
an alcove where smiling agents offered banking services 
through Allstate Savings and Loan, insurance policies 
from Allstate Insurance, and securities from Dean Wit­
ter—Sears subsidiaries all. Customers, not regulators, 
showed that no economies of scope were to be found 
in the Sears approach: The alcoves were returned to 
retail use, and the subsidiaries were sold. By the time 
Sears recovered from this excursion,Walmart was riding 
high and Sears was headed for the ropes. 
Another failed expansion of scope was Citicorp’s 
acquisition of The Travelers, a major insurance firm that 
had previously acquired the Smith 
ment banking. Banks in Germany and Switzerland have 
always been free to engage in underwriting and securi­
ties holding to no obvious harm. British banks are 
slightly more regulated: They are not allowed to sell 
insurance. 
Backed partly by the reputation and stature of Paul 
Volcker, the Dodd-Frank act is now law. A provision 
that at least echoes the Volcker rule prohibits “high 
risk” proprietary trading by banks (trading for their 
own account). However, the distinction between 
propr ietary trading and similar but supposedly benign 
forms of trading is left to regulators. Thus the effects 
of this and the act’s other loosely related provisions 
won’t really be known until a passel of regulations are 
written and implemented. Very likely the full effects 
of Dodd-Frank won’t be apparent 
Bar ney brokerage. The resulting until the next financial crisis. It is dis-While the Volcker 
combination was chr istened Citi- turbing that the urban myths that 
group but the hoped-for synergies rule does not seem to backed Glass-Stegall have survived 
never appeared and Travelers was like a dormant virus in the person of be a return to Glass-
sold. This happened long before Citi- Mr. Volcker, as his quoted testimony 
group was rescued by a federal Steagall, it is disturbing suggests, and have re-emerged in 
bailout. Citigroup, incidentally, is the Dodd-Frank.that Volcker has successor of the National City Bank Glass-Steagall tore investment 
of Glass-Steagall fame. bought the urban banks out of the arms of their com­
mercial banking parents. After that 
The End-Around myth supporting it. they stood alone, first as partnerships 
Sears and Citigroup aside, some firms achieved a substantial degree of financial inte­
gration in the 1980s and ’90s. Banks had figured out 
how to dodge the Glass-Steagall prohibition on owner­
ship of firms “engaged principally” in underwriting and 
securities dealings.They simply formed subsidiaries that 
conducted a large enough volume of other business 
that they could legitimately claim they escaped the 
“engaged principally” clause.This avenue was not avail­
able to smaller institutions that could not marshal the 
required volume of business to employ this dodge.Thus 
by the 1990s Glass-Steagall was fast becoming a dead 
letter. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 acknowl­
edged the situation and provided a straightforward path 
toward financial integration as opposed to the variety 
of side routes that had been taken. 
Incidentally, no other developed country has ever 
seen fit to separate commercial banking from invest-
and then, starting with Merrill Lynch 
in 1971, as corporations. More recently they began to 
convert themselves into bank-holding companies. In 
September 2008 the last two major stand-alone invest­
ment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, took 
the plunge. At a stroke these institutions gained certain 
advantages such as borrowing privileges at the Fed’s 
Discount Window, while subjecting themselves to 
stricter regulations on leverage and borrowing. Most 
important, their explicit status as banks gives them 
greater assurance of a future bailout should failure 
loom again. 
Scapegoat 
The timing of the repeal of Glass-Steagall makes this deregulatory move a convenient scapegoat 
for the financial crisis. But the crisis began with the 
housing collapse, a result of government encourage-
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ment of unsound lending practices. Financial firms 
took too much risk with mortgage-backed secur ities, 
in part because of moral hazard engendered by gov­
ernment guarantees and partly because bond rating 
firms were not as independent as was once thought. 
The limited liability that the investment banks gained 
when they became corporations may also have ampli­
fied moral hazard. There is no good reason to believe 
that Glass-Steagall, had it remained in effect, would 
have prevented any of these problems. 
A panoply of myths grew up around the Great 
Depression, many of which are only now being 
debunked. Sadly, the current Great Recession may 
spawn a new set of myths, among them the supposed 
role of Glass-Steagall’s repeal. We have seen how 1930s 
congressional hearings produced scapegoats that led to 
Glass-Steagall’s separation of investment banking from 
commercial banking. Is history repeating? Last April the 
Securities and Exchange Commission filed securities 
fraud charges against Goldman Sachs. The civil com­
plaint, since settled for $550 million, contended that the 
firm stacked the deck on billions of dollars worth of 
mortgage securities in favor of insiders and at the 
expense of outsiders. At this writing the Manhattan 
U.S. Attorney’s office is conducting an investigation 
that could lead to criminal charges. And Goldman 
executives were subject to some 11 hours of intensive 
questioning in front of a Senate committee, during 
which they largely stood their ground. 
We do not know whether the charges against Gold-
man Sachs have merit, but the parallels between that 
firm and the National City Bank of 1933 are eerie. We 
may well be seeing the manufacture of another scape­
goat. 
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